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THE PAST AND FUTURE OF IMPLIED CAUSES OF
ACTION UNDER THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940
Arthur S. Gabinet
1
George M. Gowen III
In 1940, Congress enacted the Investment Company Act, a largely regulatory statute2
governing a growing industry of certain "investment companies," better known as mutual funds.
Unlike other SEC-administered statutes, the Act provided no express private cause of action, but
the federal courts soon began allowing suits under the Act by private investors, finding that such
rights of action were "implied" in the Act. This pattern went largely unchecked -- and relatively
unchallenged -- until recent years; the recognition of implied private rights of action even
survived Congress' addition of an express right of action under Section 36(b) of the Act in 1970.
Recent years have witnessed a slightly more energetic debate over the issue, however, guided by
a trend in the United States Supreme Court against judicial liberalist tendencies, including the
inference and expansion of private rights under federal statutes. The Court's 1995 decision in
Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 3 directly criticizing the
analytical methods most of the lower courts have used to infer actions under the Act, sharpened
the debate.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has now pushed the debate over private suits under
the Act to the forefront of the judicial landscape. In March 2002, in Olmsted v. Pruco Life
Insurance Company,4 the Second Circuit -- historically a venerable champion of the private right
of action under the Act -- held that no private cause of action could be inferred for violations of
Sections 26(f) and 27(i) of the Act. Although these sections were enacted within the last decade,
the court's analysis -- a "back to the basics" adherence to the statutory text -- would logically
apply to other, older sections of the Act, including those under which the Second Circuit has
upheld private rights of action in the past. The court took specific steps, however, to le ave its
earlier decisions intact. As if this recent shift would not alone provoke sufficient debate, in
February 2000, shortly before deciding Olmsted, the Second Circuit handed down a decision,
Strougo v. Bassini,5 in which it allowed a private class action to proceed under Sections 36(a)
and 48 of the Act, despite its explicit recognition that Congress had not provided for private
suits.
' Mr. Gabinet and Mr. Gowen are a partner and an associate, respectively, at the law firm Dechert. They
are members of the firm's Financial Services and Securities Litigation Practice Group. Copyright ©
2002, George M. Gowen III, Arthur S. Gabinet.
2

15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 etseq. The Investment Company Act is often referred to as the "1940 Act," even

though Congress enacted the Investment Advisers Act that same year.
' 511 U.S. 164 (1994) (5-4 decision).
4

283 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2002).

5

282 F. 3d 162 (2d Cir. 2002).
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The Second Circuit's decisions set the stage for this issue to come before the Supreme
Court. In anticipation of the Court's ultimate disposition, this article attempts to provide an
historical analysis of the recognition of implied causes of action under the Act. Part I addresses
the Act itself and implied causes of action under the Act before Central Bank. Part II is an
analysis of the relevant portions of the CentralBank decision, and Part III reviews the impact of
Central Bank. Part IV is an in-depth view of the recent sharpening of the debate in the Second
Circuit.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF IMPLIED CAUSES OF ACTION UNDER THE 1940 ACT
A.

THE ORIGINAL 1940 ACT AND THE RECOGNITION OF IMPLIED CAUSES OF ACTION

The 1940 Act arose out of a sweeping reform of corporate and securities law provoked by
the economic and political events of the 1920s and the 1930s. Between 1933 and 1940,
Congress enacted six of the seven statutes currently administered by the Securities and Exchange
Commission: the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, the Investment Company Act of
6
1940, and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.
Unlike the 1933 and 1934 Acts, which
Congress designed mainly to foster disclosure, 7 Con ress designed the 1940 Act to regulate
thoroughly an industry in apparent need of supervision.
The "investment companies" governed by the Act included issuers of securities that
engage primarily in the investment in other securities, such as mutual funds. 9 By their nature,
these institutions, the managers of which have vast quantities of liquid and transferable assets at
their disposal, present ample opportunity for mismanagement and abuse.' 0 The Act imposed
certain safeguards in the industry, such as the requirement of a minimum proportion of
disinterested directors on the board of a registered investment company, " and the requirement
that a majority of these directors approve contracts for adviser services. 1 2 Unlike each of the
6

See 1 Louis Loss & Joel Seligman, SECURITIES REGULATION 166-223, 224 (3d ed. 1989).

7 The 1933 and 1934 Acts "embrace[d] a fundamental purpose... to substitute a philosophy of full

disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor." Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,
151 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted).
1 Loss & Seligman, supra note 6, at 242; 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1997); 15 U.S.C. § 79a (1997); 15 U.S.C. §
80a-l(a)(5) (1997); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(b) (1997).

8

9 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1) (1997).
10

1 Loss & Seligman, supra note 6, at 242, 247. At Congress's command, the SEC conducted a four-

year investigation of the industry. Congress expressly crafted the 1940 Act from the findings of this
investigation and, through the 1940 Act, announced its policy to curb abuse through registration
requirements and regulation. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (1997).
" 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (1997).
12

15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (1997).
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securities acts preceding it (the 1933 Act, the 1934 Act, the Public Utility Holding Company Act,
and the Trust Indenture Act), 13 the original 1940 Act did not contain any express provision for
private civil actions. The Act contained remedial measures, such as authorizations of the SEC to
bring actions for violations of certain of its provisions, but not the private causes of action such
as those found, for instance, in section 12 of the 1933 Act and section 16(b) of the 1934 Act.
Seemingly contemporaneously with the growth of mutual funds in the 1950s and
1960's,14 however, the federal courts began recognizing implied rights of action to remedy
violations of certain provisions of the Act.' 5 The courts' effective recognition often resulted
from mere assumption or concession, rather than actual adjudication. 16
The courts did
affirmatively decide the issue, but often upon unsatisfactory analysis. For example, in 1963, in
Taussig v. Wellington Fund,Inc., ' 7 the Third Circuit held that stockholder-plaintiffs could pursue
a private remedy on behalf of a fund under section 35(d) of the Act, which proscribes the use by
funds of titles or names determined to be misleading by the SEC.' 8 The court's analysis,
however, was almost admittedly lacking. 19 Ultimately, the court recognized the competing
13

See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77(k)(a) (1997); 15 U.S.C. 78i(e) (1997); 15 U.S.C. § 79p (1997); 15 U.S.C. §

77www (1997)
14

James N. Benedict, Mary K. Dulka, & C. Neil Gray, Recent Developments in Litigation under the

Investment Company Act of 1940, 1250 PLI/CORP. 643, 649 (2001).
15

"During the period 1959-62 some two dozen of the largest open-end investment companies, together

with their directors and 18 investment advisers, were involved in over 50 lawsuits centering largely, but
not entirely, around allegations of grossly excessive management or advisory fees." IX Louis Loss & Joel
Seligman, SECURITIES REGULATION 4449 n.597 (3d ed. 1989).
16

For example, in Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961), the majority of a Second Circuit panel

affirmed a district court's ruling that the allegations of mutual fund shareholders sufficiently stated
violations of §§ 15(a) and (b) (contracts of advisers and underwriters) and § 37 (larceny and
embezzlement) of the Act. 294 F.2d at 420-21. A concurring opinion, however, noted that, regrettably,
the more important threshold issue of the existence of an implied private cause of action for these alleged
violations had been conceded by the defendants. Id. at 422 (Clark, J., concurring). In Levitt v. Johnson,
334 F.2d 815 (1st Cir. 1964), the First Circuit decided that strict application of state law demand
requirements to a derivative suit brought under the Act would conflict with the goals of the Act. Id. at
819. The court assumed, however, without comment, and without even noting the particular section of
the Act at issue, that the Act gave rise to such an implied right of action in the first place. Id.
17 313 F.2d 472 (3d Cir. 1963).

" 15 U.S.C. § 80a-34(d) (1997).
19

First, as was astutely pointed out in a dissenting opinion, § 35(d) prohibits only the use of names found

misleading by the SEC, suggesting that civil enforcement should occur exclusively through, or should at
least be preceded by, an SEC determination. Taussig, 313 F.2d at 482 (Smith, J., dissenting). The court
cited the jurisdictional section of the Act, which bestows on the federal courts jurisdiction of "all suits in
equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by, or to enjoin any violation of
the Act," 15 U.S.C. § 80a-43 (1997), as its only legislative authority for its decision, noting that while the
Act did not expressly grant any private cause of action, this section "seems to provide a forum for such
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positions on the issue of whether a private right can be derived from the Act, and it simply chose
the position that a right could be so inferred, for no other apparent reasons than that this position
was "not frivolous," that it was not expressly proscribed
by Supreme Court law, and that other
20
courts had adopted it in inteipreting the 1934 Act.
B. THE 1970 AMENDMENTS

In a key event in the history of implied causes of action under the Act," in 1970
Congress amended the 1940 Act to add section 36(b): an express right of action for the violation
of fiduciary duties. A Senate Committee found that "mutual funds, with rare exception," are
operated not by their own employees, but by separate organizations known as "investment
advisers." 2 2 "The[se] advisers select the funds' investments and operate their businesses" and in
return are paid fees, often calculated as a percentage of the funds' net assets. 2 3 The committee
found that this unique structure is different than the normal relationship between buyers and
sellers of services, as the funds' dependence on the advisers practically prevented the funds from
suits." Taussig, 313 F.2d at 476. The court did not note that this jurisdictional statement is substantially
similar to the counterpart provisions in other SEC statutes that do expressly provide for private causes of
action, such as § 78aa of the 1934 Exchange Act..
20

Id. Each of these three reasons, however, would apply equally to support a decision that no implied

right of action existed. In 1961, in Broukv. ManagedFunds, Inc., 286 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1961), vacated
as moot by agreement, 369 U.S. 424 (1962), the Eighth Circuit, noting that it would find an implied right
of action only to "implement a manifest legislative intent," id. at 912, held that the 1940 Act did not by
implication create a private cause of action against directors of funds. Id. A few years later, however, the
court called its own decision into question in GreaterIowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783 ( 8th Cir.
1967). There, the court stated that, in light of the Supreme Court's holding in J.IL Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426 (1964), that § 14(a) of the 1934 Act implicitly gave rise to private civil remedies, and its
directive to the federal courts "to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief where federally
secured rights are invaded," Borak, 377 U.S. at 433, it should "reexamine" its holding in Brouk.
McLendon, 378 F.2d at 793. In Esplin v. Hirschi,402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968), the court found that
"although the Investment Company Act makes no specific provision for private civil liability arising from
the violations of the Act," private rights of action "may be implied." 402 F.2d at 103. The court's only
analysis, however, was its brief notation of an apparent "strong indication" to find private civil liability
under federal statutes announced in Borak. Id.
21

Mutual funds had grown during the 1950's and 1960's. As a result, investment advisers to the funds,

which often earned a fee based on a fixed percentage of the particular fund's assets, had begun to earn
increasingly large fees. SEC, Public Policy Implications of Investment Company Growth, H.R. Rep. No.
2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); see generally Benedict, et al., Recent Developments, supra note 14, at
648. In a 1966 report to Congress, the SEC noted that, among other problems in the industry, these fixedpercentage fees failed to recognize the economies of scale present in managing large funds. SEC, Public
Policy Implications of Investment Company Growth, H.R. Rep. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966);
see generally Benedict, et al., Recent Developments, supra note 14, at 648.
22

S. Rep. 91-184.

23 Id.
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severing the relationship. Thus, found the committee, "the forces of arm's-length bargaining"
present "in other sectors of the American economy" are not present in the mutual fund industry. 24
To address this concern, Congress added section 36(b), which imposed a fiduciary duty on the
investment advisers of registered funds "with respect to the receipt of compensation for
services," and which expressly provided a cause of action, not only to the SEC but to
shareholders of registered funds, for breach of this duty.2 5 Thus, the Act, which once did not
expressly provide for a private cause of action to enforce any of its provisions, now expressly
authorized private citizens to enforce one, but only one, of its provisions. On the other hand,
Congress, while making substantial amendments to the Act, had not expressly overruled the
implied rights of action recognized by the courts since the Act's inception. In fact, the Senate
Report expressly cautioned that the fact that subsection (b) specifically provides for a private
right of action "should not be read by implication to affect subsection (a).
While the addition of section 36(b) suggested to some that implied rights of action should
no longer be recognized, the effect of the 1970 Amendments on the recognition of implied
causes of action by the federal courts, if anything, was liberalizing. 27 The courts not only
rejected the argument that the amendment adding section 36(b) indicated Congressional intent
that courts not allow private suits under any other provisions, but they embraced the 1970
Amendments, which left the federal courts' pattern of recognizing implied rights of action intact,
as further evidence that Congress approved of such recognition. For example, in Tannenbaum v.
24

Id.

15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1997). Bolstering subsequent arguments that Congress "knew how" to create a
cause of action when it "wanted to," Congress set forth the parameters of the cause of action. The
plaintiff would bear the burden of proving a breach of fiduciary duty. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(1).
Damages would be limited to the actual damage suffered through the breach and could not exceed the
total compensation received by the defendant. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(3). Damages would also be limited
to those incurred within one year of the institution of the action. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(3). Jurisdiction
would lie exclusively with the federal district courts of the United States. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(5).
25

26

S.Rep. 91-184; see also H. Rep. No. 91-1382, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. 38 (1970).

27

Just after the 1970 Amendments, in 1971, the First Circuit decided Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369

(1971), a case involving allegations of an investment adviser's failure to recapture brokerage
commissions paid by its mutual fund client. The court confirmed its authority to grant civil recovery for
acts falling within the proscription of "gross misconduct or gross abuse of trust" contained in the preamendment § 36, glossing over in a footnote the fact that the recent amendments had removed this
language. 445 F.2d at 373 & n.7. The amendment substituted the phrase, "breach of fiduciary duty
involving personal misconduct" for the removed language. The House Committee Report set forth an
explanation of this language: "In appropriate cases, non-feasance of duty or abdication of responsibility
would constitute a breach of fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct." See Report of the
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H. Rep. No. 1382, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1970). In
1975, in Fogel v. Chestnutt, 533 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1975) ("Fogel 1"), the Second Circuit followed Moses
and assumed the existence of private liability for breach of fiduciary duty with respect to the recapture of
brokerage fees; the parties did not contest the issue. See Fogel v. Chestnutt, 668 F.2d 100, 105 (2d Cir.
1981).
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Zeller,28 a case involving allegations of an investment adviser's failure to recapture brokerage
commissions paid by its mutual fund client, the Second Circuit noted that the original form of
section 36 expressly authorized SEC injunction actions and implicitly authorized private actions.
The court rejected the argument that Congress' addition of an explicit right of action with respect
to compensation was intended to abrogate the private actions already recognized by the courts
for other types of breach of fiduciary duty. 29
In 1981, in Fogel v. Chestnutt ("Fogel IT'), 30 the appellants argued that Supreme Court
authority decided after Fogel Irendered the court's and the parties' assumption of the availability
of private recovery in Fogel I incorrect. 3 1 The appellants argued that TransamericaMortgage
Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979), in which the Supreme Court held that the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 did not imply a private cause of action for damages, changed the
landscape. 32 The court rejected this argument, noting that Transamericadid allow a private suit
in equity under the Advisers Act, and the jurisdictional grant in the Advisers Act, originally
drafted as identical to that in the Investment Company Act, was changed prior to enactment to
provide jurisdiction for only "suits in equity" and not "actions at law." 33 The court again
rejected the notion that the addition of the cause of action in section 36(b) abrogated the existing
implied causes of action, noting that, rather, the fact that thk Investment Company Act had been
overhauled after these rights of action had been recognized suggests Congressional approval.3 4

2' 552 F.2d 402

(2d Cir. 1977).

29

552 F.2d at 416-17.

30

668 F.2d 100 (2d Cir. 1981).

31

668 F.2d at 105.

32

Id. at 109. The appellants also cited Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). In Cort, the Supreme Court

transformed the test for the availability of private rights of action from the simple question of whether the
plaintiff was a member of a specia l class for whose benefit the statute was enacted, to a more rigid, fourfactor analysis of the actual words and intent of Congress. See Cort, 422 U.S. at 78 (noting the following
factors: 1) whether the plaintiff is a member of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted; 2)
whether there is any explicit or implicit indication of Congressional intent to create or withhold private
remedies; 3) whether the availability of private recovery would be consistent with the purposes of the
statute; and 4) whether the contemplated private cause of action is one conventionally relegated to state
law). In later years, the Court further refined the Cort test, stating that legislative intent is the most
important factor, while the others are supplementary. See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442
U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979) (holding that not all the Cort factors should be weighted equally and that the
main inquiry is congressional intent). The Fogel I court noted that the appellants had cited Cort v. Ash
and Touche Ross, but it commented only on Transamerica. Id. at 109-12.
33 Fogel II, 668 F. 2d at 109.
34 Id. at 111-12. In 1990, as part of the Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1990, Congress
added the "actions at law" language to the jurisdictional grant in the Advisors Act, the absence of which
proved so important to the Transamerica Court. The legislative history surrounding the 1990 amendment

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vjlim/vol3/iss2/1
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C. THE 1980 HOUSE REPORT

A House Committee Report that accompanied additional amendments to the Act in 1980,
through the Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980, provided additional, retrospective
support for the courts that had decided that finding implied rights of action under the Act should
continue after the 1970 Amendments.
The rationale for implying rights of action under the
securities laws beyond those actions expressly provided for had
been well articulated by the Supreme Court when it observed that
implied private rights of actions allowing shareholders to sue to
remedy their losses would significantly assist the congressional
goal of promoting fair corporate suffrage. But in recent years, the
Supreme Court turned its focus toward a strict construction of
statutory language and expressed intent.
The Committee wishes to make plain that it expects the
courts to imply private rights of action under this legislation, where
the plaintiff falls within the class of person protected by the
statutory provision in question. Such a right would be consistent
with and further Congress' intent in enacting that provision, and
where such actions would not improperly occupy an area
traditionally the concern of state law. In appropriate instances, for
example, breaches of fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct
should be remedied under Section 36(a) of the Investment
Company Act.
With respect to the business development
companies, the Committee contemplates suits by shareholders as
well as by the Commission, since these are the persons the
provision is designed to protect, and such private rights of action
will assist in carrying out the remedial purposes of Section 36.
In Bancroft Convertible Fund v. Zico Investment Holdings, Inc.,36 the Third Circuit

opined that "[c]learly, the Committee Report expressly approves the position of those courts
which, following the 1970 amendments, held that private causes of action should be implied
from the Investment Company Act." 37 The court held that a private right of action existed under
does not suggest that the addition of this language represents congressional intent to create a private right
of action for damages under the Advisers Act.
35 H.R. Rep. No. 1341, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 28-29 (1980). The 1980 enactment added a number of new

provisions to the Act, giving special treatment to certain business development companies and, in effect,
amending existing provisions of the Act. Thus, the statements in the House Committee Report were only
partially retrospective.
36

825 F.2d 731 (3d Cir. 1987).

37

825 F.2d at 736.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002

7

Villanova Journal of Law and Investment Management, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 1
PAGE 52

VILLANOVA JOURNAL OF LAW AND
INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT

section 12(d)(1)(A) of the Act, which prohibits the acquisition by an investment company of
more than three percent of the outstanding stock of another investment company.38
II. CENTRAL BANK
In 1994, however, the Supreme Court cast considerable doubt on the statutory
interpretive principles that supported the decisions of those courts that had recognized private
rights of action under the Act. Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. FirstInterstate Bank of Denver,
N.A., was not about the Investment Company Act, but rather the scope of the implied private
right of action under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. The Court had granted certiorarito resolve
confusion among the lower courts about the viability of private liability for section 10(b) aiding
and abetting in light of the Court's recent strict interpretations of the securities laws in Santa Fe
Industries, Inc. v. Green4 1 and Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.4 2 The Court noted that, in defining
the scope of a statutory prohibition, it must adhere strictly to the statutory text, and it would not
allow a private section 10(b) suit for conduct not prohibited by the text of the statute. 4 3 Noting
that the text also did not mention aiding and abetting, the Court rejected the SEC's argument that
the phrase "directly or indirectly" in the text of the statute indicated coverage of aiding and
38

Id. at 733, 736. Other courts held similarly. See, e.g., In re ML-LEE Acquisition Fund II, L.P. & ML-

LEE Acquisition Fund (RetirementAccounts) II, L.P. Sec. Litig., 848 F. Supp. 527, 538-49 (D. Del. 1994)
(finding implied rights of action under §§ 17(j), 36(a), and 57(a), (d)); Lessler v. Little, 857 F.2d 866, 873
(1 st Cir. 1988) (recognizing private cause of action under section 17(a)(2) of the Investment Company
Act); Fogel v. Chestnutt, 668 F.2d 100, 111 (2d Cir. 1981) (recognizing implied rights of action for
damages under section 36(a) of Investment Company Act where advisers or directors breach fiduciary
duty); Meyer v. OppenheimerManagement Corp. 764 F.2d 76, 86-88 (2d Cir. 1985) (recognizing implied
private right of action under section 15(f) of Investment Company Act); Krome v. MerrillLynch & Co.,
637 F. Supp. 910 (recognizing implied private rights of action under sections 10(b), 15(a-b), 17(a), 22,
34(a), and 36 of the Investment Company Act), vacated in part, 110 F.R.D. 693 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Jerozal
v. Cash Reserve Management, Inc., No. 81 Civ. 1569, 1982 WL 1363, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. August 10,
1982) (recognizing implied private rights of action under sections 15, 35(b), 47(a) of the Investment
Company Act); CambridgeFund,Inc. v. Abella, 501 F. Supp. 598, 622-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (implying
private right of action under 36(a) and 37 of the Investment Company Act). But see Potomac Capital
Markets Corp. v. Prudential-BacheCorp. Dividend Fund,Inc., 726 F. Supp. 87, 92-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(denying rights of action under §§ 13(a)(4), 25(a), although recognizing private right to enforce §
13(a)(3); M.J. Whitman & Co. v. American Fin. Enter., Inc., 552 F. Supp. 17, 22 (S.D. Ohio 1982)
(holding that no general private right of action existed against company's failing to register under the
Act), aff'd, 725 F.2d 394 (6th Cir. 1984).
39 511 U.S. 164 (1994) (5-4 decision).
40

Id. at 165-67.

41

430 U.S. 462 (1977). See id. at 473 (holding that § 10(b) does not prohibit breaches of fiduciary duty

without misrepresentation or lack of disclosure).
42

425 U.S. 185 (1976). See id. at 199 (holding that § 10(b) does not reach negligent conduct).

43

CentralBank, 511 U.S. at 173.
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4 4 as "Congress knew how to impose aiding and abetting
abetting,
liability when it chose to do
'
" 45

so .

The CentralBank Court went on, however, in dicta, assuming arguendo that it needed to
look beyond the text of the statute to determine its scope, to opine on "'how the 1934 Congress
would have addressed the issue had the 1Ob-5 action been included as an express provision in the
1934 Act. ' ' ' 6 In so doing, the Court addressed arguments concerning congressional intent. The
Court rejected the argument that references to aiding and abetting liability under section 10(b) in
1983 and 1988 Committee Reports demonstrated congressional intent that 10(b) prohibits aiding
and abetting: "We have observed on more than one occasion that the interpretation given by one
Congress (or a committee or member thereo) to an earlier statute is of little assistance in
discerning the meaning of that statute." 4 7 The Court also cast doubt on the strength of the
"acquiescence" doctrine as an indicator of congressional intent, noting that the mere fact that
Congress had amenled the 1934 Act after the courts first began recognizing a private section
10(b) remedy for aiding and abetting did not represent affirmative congressional approval of the
statutory precedents. 4 8 Similarly, in addressing an argument about rejected additions to the 1934
Act that would have expressly outlawed aiding or abetting a violation of the Act, the Court noted
49
that "failed legislative proposals" are shaky ground on which to rest statutory interpretation.
Thus, the Court, either wittingly or unwittingly, clearly rejected the interpretive principles
upholding decisions such as Tannenbaum, Fogel II, and Bancroft. As was noted by the Central
Bank Court, however, its task -- to determine the scope of the prohibitions of a statute -- was
more limited than that before those courts -- to determine whether to recognize an implied right
of action at all. 50 The Court expressly distinguished the two questions: "With [respect] to the
first issue, the scope of conduct prohibited by section 10(b), [as opposed to the question of the
existence of a private right of action under section 10(b)], the text of the statute controls our
decision." 5 1 The Court did not explain why congressional silence would control the question of
the scope of the prohibitions of a statute, but not the question of who may enforce those
prohibitions, but, nonetheless, it carefully drew that distinction before rendering its opinion.
44

Id. at 175-76.

45

Id. at 176.

46

Id. at 178 (quoting Musick, Peeler& Garretv. Employers Ins., 508 U.S. 286, 294 (1993)).

Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 168 (1989) (quoted in CentralBank, 511
U.S. at 185-86).
47

48

CentralBank, 511 U.S. at 186.

49

Id. at 187.

50

See id. at 172-73 (noting the distinction between determining the scope of conduct prohibited by §

10(b) and deciding elements of an implied private liability scheme).
51

Id. at 173.
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Thus, the rationale of the Central Bank holding does not ultimately control the question of
implied rights of action under the 1940 Act. Some commentators have overreacted to the
Central Bank decision and opined that it does, but that is inaccurate.5 2 In particular, the Central
Bank Court's comment, "Congress knew how to impose aiding and abetting liability when it
chose to do so," 53 has been taken out of context to suggest that Congress also knew how to create
a private right of action when it chose to do so. Because the Central Bank Court was
determining the scope of implied rights of action under section 10(b), however, implicit in its
holding was the recognition that Congress may not always "know how" to create a right of action
when it "wants to," and often leaves that task to the courts.
III. IMPLIED RIGHTS OF ACTION UNDER THE 1940 ACT AFTER CENTRAL BANK
Central Bank did not deter federal courts from interpreting the Act to provide private
remedies. In Krouner v. American Heritage Fund, Inc., 54 the court dismissed claims brought
under section 8(b)(3) and (5) of the Act, which governs the required disclosures in a registration
statement, and under section 13(a)(3), which governs deviation from investment policies. 5 5 This
was only because the complaint failed to state a violation of either section, however, and not
because of any doubt over the existence of a private cause of action for such a violation. In fact,
the court did not differentiate between these claims and the plaintiff s claim under section 36(b).
In Langner v. Brown, 5 6 another court of the Southern District of New York addressed the issue,
but it relied directly on interpretive tools rejected by Central Bank. The court did not cite
Central Bank and, constrained by the holding of Fogel I[ (the rationale of which was called into
question by, but which was technically left intact by, Central Bank), held that the only question
was whether the plaintiffs fell within the class of persons the particular section of the Act was
designed to protect.57 In 1996, in Blatt v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,Fenner & Smith Inc.,5 8 the court
cited Central Bank, but only for the proposition that its analysis must begin with the text of the
statute. 59 The court went on to hold that sections 47 and 44, which provide, respectively, that
52 Some commentators have reported, inaccurately, that "Central Bank plainly instructs that absent

express statutory language providing citizens a private right of action, federal courts should decline to
imply one." See, e.g., Benedict, et al., Recent Developments, supra note 14, at 665-66. To the contrary,
CentralBank interpreted the scope of conduct reachable through an implied right of action under § 10(b).
The decision simply cannot be construed as "signal[ing] a strong presumption against implying rights of
action under the federal securities laws." Id. at 665.
51 CentralBank, 511 U.S. at 176.
54 899 F. Supp. 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
55 Id. at 148-49.
56

913 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).

57

Id. at 268.

51 916 F. Supp. 1343 (D.N.J. 1996).
59

Id. at 1349.
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contracts in violation of the Act are unenforceable and rescindable and that federal courts have
jurisdiction over suits at law and equity under the Act, sufficiently evidenced congressional
intent to provide a private remedy under sections such as section 7 of the Act.
Other district
courts decided cases presenting implied rights of action under the 1940 Act without any
discussion of the issue at all, let alone comment on the impact of Central Bank.6 1
The first decision to deal head on with the teachings of Central Bank was In re Nuveen
Fund Litigation, in which the court recognized private causes of action under sections 34(b) and
36(a) of the 1940 Act. 62 First distinguishing Transamerica,the court stated that the subsequent
legislative history of the Act and the fact that Congress had not yet commented on or prohibited
implied rights of action were indicators of congressional intent to allow private remedies. 6 3 The
court rejected the defendants' argument that CentralBank rendered this reasoning unsupportable,
but in doing so, it simply relied on the type of evidence of congressional intent rejected by
Central Bank: the 1980 House Committee report expressing the expectation that courts will
recognize implied rights of action. 64 The Nuveen court stated that this report carried weight
despite Central Bank, because the subsequent congressional reports at issue in Central Bank
contained, as the Central Bank Court noted, only "oblique" references to aiding and abetting
liability, while the 1980 House report expressly encouraged private rights of action under the
1940 Act. 65 This misinterpretation of Central Bank appears almost forced; quite clearly, the
CentralBank Court's criticism was that the reports represented the thoughts of one committee of
a subsequent Congress, not that the language in the reports was insufficiently direct 6 6 -- a
criticism that applies equally to the 1980 House report. In fact, the only indicator of
congressional intent cited by Nuveen that may survive Central Bank's criticism is the Senate
Report accompanying the addition of section 36(b) in 1970, cautioning against any inference that
60

Id. at 1349-50.

In Sheppardv. TCW/DW Term Trust 2000, 938 F. Supp. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), the court avoided the
issue of whether § 13(a)(3) provided for private recovery by finding that the complaint faile d to state a
violation of the section. See id. at 180 n.7 ("Having found that plaintiffs fail to allege that the Trusts
deviated from their fundamental policies, the Court need not address the disputed issue of whether
Section 13(a)(3) of the 1940 Act provides a private right of action."). In In re Alliance North American
Government Income Trust, Inc. Securities Litigation, No. 95 Civ. 0330 (LMM), 1996 WL 551732
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 1996), the court decided a motion to dismiss claims under the §§ 13(a)(3), 34(b),
35(d) and 48 of the Act, without any discussion about whether private recovery under those sections was
even available. Id. at *3-9. Apparently, the parties did not raise the issue, and the court did not see a
need to raise it sua sponte.
61

62

No. 94 C 360, 1996 WL 328006 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 1996).

63

Id., 1996 WL 328006, at * 5.

64

Id. at *5.

6'

Nuveen, 1996 WL 328006, at *6.

66

CentralBank, 511 U.S. at 185.
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the new cause of action changed the state of the law with respect to section 36(a). 6 7 That report,
however, speaks to contemporary congressional intentions only for section 36(b). It does not
support the Nuveen court's holding that section 34(b) provides a private right of action, and it
does not speak to the intentions of the 1940 Congress that enacted section 36(a). 6 8
In Strougo v. Scudder, Stevens & Clark, Inc., 69 a court in the Southern District of New
York followed suit, citing Nuveen and holding that section 36(a) implied a private right of action,
despite Central Bank. The court noted that the cameral reports that stated that the addition of
section 36(b) did not affect section 36(a), but the court also went on to cite the statements in the
1980 House Committee Report, despite its own recognition that an important factor in
determining an implied right of action is "the contemporary legal context in which Congress
acted.", 7 0 Strougo does not deserve the extent of the criticism it has received; it certainly is not
guilty of ignoring any "marked aversion toward implied rights" shown in Central Bank,7 1 as
Central Bank, defining the conduct reachable through an implied right of action under section
10(b), displayed no such aversion.
Strougo, however, like Nuveen, resonates with an
inconsistency on the treatment of congressional silence and inaction. According to its logic,
where Congress does not expressly overrule court action, it has approved it. Where Congress
has enacted a private cause of action for some sections but has not for others, however, the courts
72
acknowledge nothing implicit in this silence.
It was not until 1997 that a court, the Seventh Circuit, signaled at least a recognition that
Central Bank had undermined the analysis that supported earlier decisions to recognize implied
rights of action under the 1940 Act. In Boland v. Engle,73 the court stated, in a footnote, that
Central Bank "cast doubt on the type of analysis that courts have used to find implied rights of
action," but that "fortunately [we] need not enter this debate because . . . we find that . . .

67 Nuveen, 1996 WL 328006, at *6.
61 Of course, one must consider the role of the fundamental doctrine of stare decisis in the analysis of the

Nuveen and other courts. At least with respect to § 36(a), the Nuveen court could have relied on prior
decisions recognizing causes of action and limited its search for congressional intent to any recent/subs.
intent to overrule those decisions. The court went further, however, and interpreted the 1970 Congress's
actions as acceptance of the entire state of judicial recognition of private recovery under the Act. See
Nuveen, 1996 WL 328006, at *6.
69 964 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
70 Id. at 796-97, & n.3 (emphasis added).
71 Benedict, et al., Recent Developments, supra note 14, at 670.
72 Of course, the 1970 Congress was not completely "silent" as to the effect of the addition of § 36(b) on
the availability of private recovery under § 36(a).
71

113 F.3d 706 (7th Cir. 1997).
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Boland's ICA claims were properly dismissed for other reasons." 7 4 Still, subsequent district
75
court decisions assumed or recognized the presence of private rights of action under the Act.

IV.
A.

OLMSTED

THE DISTRICT COURT'S OPINION

In fact, the first district court to carefully consider and then reject the notion of implied
rights of action under the Act, Olmsted v. Pruco Life Insurance Company of New Jersey,7 6 did
not even rely heavily on Central Bank. The Olmsted court faced the question, of first
impression, of whether sections 80a-26(e) (requiring reasonable fees deducted in connection with
variable insurance contracts) and 80a-27(i) (requiring compliance with section 80a-26(e) in sale
of variable insurance contracts) provided a private cause of action. 77 These sections had been
added to the Act by amendments in 1996.78 Although the court did not cite Central Bank at this
point in its analysis, it seemed to be acting in reaction to its teachings, as the court answered this
question by going back to the basics of statutory interpretation, and avoiding the interpretive
principles rejected by in Central Bank. The court noted that, since 1975, determining the
availability of a private cause of action involved not merely asking whether the plaintiff was a
member of a class the statute was designed to protect. 7 9 Rather, the analysis followed the fourpart test announced in Cort v. Ash, which had been subsequently tailored to focus especially on
legislative intent. 80 Searching for legislative intent, the court held that, given the Act's broad
grant of power to the SEC to investigate and bring injunction or penalty actions for violations of
the Act, "it is highly improbable that 'Congress absentmindedly forgot to mention an intended
private action' as a supplemental enforcement mechanism. ' 8 1 The court also held that the fact
that Congress added the express cause of action in section 36(b) further indicated that when
Congress wanted to create a right of action, "it knew how to do so." 82 Having decided the
74

Id. at 715 n.9.

See, e.g., Green v. FundAsset Mgmt., L.P., 19 F. Supp. 2d 227, 232 (D.N.J. 1998) (assuming existence
of private right of action under § 36(a) of the 1940 Act); Young v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 2 F. Supp. 2d
914, 925 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (holding that § 36(a) implies a private right of action, despite the teachings of
CentralBank).
75

76

134 F. Supp. 2d 508 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).

77

Id. at511.

71

15 U.S.C. § 80a-26(e) (1997); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27(i) (1997).

79

Olmsted, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 512.

8o

Id.

81

Id. at 513 (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 742 (1979) (Powell, J.,

dissenting)).
82 Id.
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paramount issue of congressional intent, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument under another
Cort factor, that they were members of the class the sections were designed to protect. 8 3 Citing
Central Bank, the court also rejected the 1980 House report relied on so heavily by courts in
previous decisions. 84 Because sections 80a-26(e) and 80a-27(i) had been added in 1996 to deal
specifically with variable insurance contracts,8 5the years of decisions recognizing implied rights
of action under the Act did not sway the court.
B.

THE SECOND CIRCUIT DECISION

Understandably, the plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Second Circuit -- the court that
decided Tannenbaum, Fogel I, and Fogel II. In its March 7, 2002 opinion, the court adopted a
markedly different approach than it had in years past, focusing on the seemingly basic and
fundamental tenet that had been absent from many prior opinions on the subject: when
determining whether Congress intended a cause of action to exist, the most telling indicator is the
simple fact that Congress did not do so itself. With this "back-to-the-basics" approach, the court
correctly stated that even implied rights of action under federal law do not exist unless it may be
determined that Congress actually intended that they exist, "'no matter how desirable that may
be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute."' 6 A court must begin the search for
the necessary congressional intent with the text of the statute itself and "cannot ordinarily
87
conclude that Congress intended to create a right of action when none was explicitly provided."
Because the Act did not explicitly provide for a cause of action under either of the sections at
issue in Olmsted, the court held that a presumption existed that Congress did not intend to create
a cause of action. 88 The court reasoned that this fundamental presumption was strengthened by
three additional factors. The first was the fact that sections 26(f) and 27(i) do not contain
"rights-creating language"; the sections provide only that certain conduct is "unlawful" and
reflect no focus on the persons protected.89 Second, the Act provides the SEC with authority to
83

Olmsted, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 515.

84 Id. at 515.
85 Id. at 516.
86

Olmsted v. Pruco Life Ins. Co., 283 F. 3d 429, 432 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532

U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001)). In an amicus curiae brief, the SEC declined to adopt a position on the question
of the availability of private recovery under §§ 26 (e) and 27 (i). Rather, the SEC argued that the
plaintiffs' claims could be adequately addressed through the express remedial scheme available under §
47 (b), which permits recission of and restitution of amounts paid under an unlawful portion of a contract.
It is not clear whether the SEC's argument reflects a shift in its position on private enforcement of the
Act, or whether it reflects a hope that the court would find a way to affirm without disturbing its earlier,
more fundamental decisions.
87 Id.

88 Id.

89

Id. at 432-33.
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enforce all its provisions; this express provision of one specific enforcement mechanism
indicates congressional intent to preclude others. 90 Third, Congress's provision of the express
remedy in section 36(b) for breaches of fiduciary duties also suggested "that omission of an
explicit private right to enforce cther sections was intentional." 9 ' With the addition of these
three factors, the court concluded
that the presumption that Congress did not intend to create a
' 92
cause of action was "strong."
The court went on to reject each of the plaintiffs' arguments raised to rebut the
presumption. The plaintiffs argued that the court should not depart from the long line of cases
finding implied rights under the Act. 9 3 The court stated that "when those cases were decided,"
the courts were without the restrictions imposed in 1975 by Cort v. Ash, or the reference in
subsequent decisions, and had "more latitude to weigh statutory policy and other
considerations." 9 4 The court also rejected the plaintiffs' "legal context" argument -- that in
enacting sections 26(f) and 27(i), Congress expected and relied on courts to infer causes of
action, given their past history of doing so.95 The court held that context serves only to clarify
ambiguous text, and the text of the 1940 Act unambiguously did not provide for a cause of
action. 96 The plaintiffs also pointed to the 1980 House Committee Report and to a 1996 House
Committee Report accompanying sections 26(f) and 27(i), 97 but the court rejected those sources
because "[w]here the text of a statute is unambiguous, 'judicial inquiry is complete[ ] except in
rare and exceptional circumstances," '' 98 with "legislative history instructive only upon 'the most
extraordinary showing of contrary intentions. "'99 The 1980 report, which post-dated the Act and

90

See id. at 433 ("'The Express provision of one method enforcing a substantive rule suggests that

Congress intended to preclude others ....Sometimes the suggestion is so strong that it precludes a
finding of congressional intent to create a private right of action, even though other aspects of the statute.
. suggest the contrary."' (quoting Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 290)).
91

Olmsted, 283 F. 3d at 433.

92

id.

93

Id. at 433-34.

94

Id. at 434. The cases cited by the court in this distinction, however, all were decided after 1975, not to

mention the court's own 1977 decision in Tannenbaum and its 1981 decision in Fogel II.
95

Id. at 434-35.

96

Olmsted, 283 F. 3d at 435.

97

The 1996 House Committee Report states that the new provisions subject variable insurance contracts

to the same general prohibitions on excessive fees as mutual funds.
98

Olmsted, 283 F. 3d at 435 (quoting Garciav. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1985)).

99 Id. (quoting Garcia, 469 at 75).
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pre-dated sections 26(f) and
27(i), did not qualify, and the 1996 report contained no contrary
00
indications as to remedies. 1
Litigants hoping for a more fundamental and conservative approach to implied causes of
action under the Act have no cause for complaint about this decision, but, in a certain fight, the
Olmsted holding is inconclusive and unsatisfying, if for no other reason than its direct
contradiction with Tannenbaum and Fogel IT The critical point in the decision was a
fundamental presumption that Congress' failure to provide an express cause of action reflected
its intent that no such right of action exist. The reasoning behind this presumption, however,
would apply to the entire Act and, thus, to the questions before the court in Tannenbaum and
Fogel II. The court held that this presumption was strengthened by the facts that Congress
empowered the SEC to enforce the Act and created section 36(b), but these facts also would
apply to the entire Act and, thus, in Tannenbaum and Fogel IT In fact, in Tannenbaum, the court
had stated that Congress originally had designed section 36 to expressly authorize SEC
enforcement and to imply private damages actions against fiduciaries. Now, in Olmsted, the
court has stated that Congress's specific grant of authority to the SEC is inconsistent with an
intent to imply private enforcement authority.
The Olmsted court made an attempt to address these inconsistencies. As for the "long
line of decisions recognizing implied private rights of action as a way of promoting the policies
served by the [1940 Act],"' 10 1 the court stated that those decisions were rendered at a time when
courts had more leeway to consider statutory policy, rather than congressional intent. 10 2 The
court correctly noted that in 1975, with Cort v. Ash, the Supreme Court changed the inquiry,
from the simple question of whether a statute was enacted for the benefit of a particular class, to
a multi-factor, structured approach. 103 The court also correctly noted that post-Cort decisions
further honed the inquiry to focus predominantly on legislative intent. 104 The cases the court was
distinguishing, however, were decided after 1975.105 Moreover, Cort v. Ash predated the Second
Circuit's own decision in Tannenbaum, and the subsequent decisions cited by the court as
refining Cort v. Ash' 0 6 pre-dated its own decision in Fogel IT The Olmsted court simply did not
explain adequately why, if its decision was based on a refraining from considerations of statutory
policy, that same restraint was absent from these earlier decisions.
100 Id.
101

Id. at 433-34.

102

Id. at 434.

103

Olmsted, 283 F. 3d at 434.

104

Id.

105

See id.at 434 n.4 (citing cases dated form 1985 through 1998).

106

Touche Ross & Co. v.Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transportation

Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77 (1981).
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In a footnote, the court also specifically addressed the conflict with Fogel II, stating that
Fogel II was simply an "assumption" that, in enacting section 36(b) in 1970, Congress had not
overruled prior judicial recognition of implied causes of action. 107 The Court distinguished
Fogel II from Olmsted only on the grounds that Olmsted dealt with new sections of the Act, the
implicit potential of which could not have been addressed by a court prior to 1970.108 The court
stated "[w]e express no opinion on the current validity of our assumption in Fogel [II] because in
this case we interpret sections added after Congress created the private right of action in
section36(b)."' 0 9 The court had cited the addition of section 36(b), however, as evidence that10
Congress did not intend to imply fights of action and "'knew how do to so . . . expressly."'I
The court seemed to hold that, under its reasoning, causes of action that already had been
recognized by 1970 were valid. Surely, however, the court could not be suggesting that
Congress only learned "how to do so" between the 1940 legislation and the 1970 amendments.
In any event, the court's holdings in Fogel II and Tannenbaum obviously were not supported
solely by a finding that the addition of section 36(b) did not completely overrule prior decisions.
Those decisions built on earlier rulings that private fights in fact existed, and those earlier rulings
were based on reasoning rejected in Olmsted. Thus, even accepting this strained effort to leave
Fogel II intact, given the fundamental and broad-ranging reasoning supporting the Olmsted
opinion, it stands in stark contrast to, and seriously undermines, Tannenbaum and Fogel IT
The inconsistency of the Olmsted opinion, or at least the failure of the Olmsted court to
state expressly that its holding constituted a shift away from opinions like Tannenbaum and
Fogel, is exacerbated by another Second Circuit decision handed down only a week before
Olmsted. In Strougo v. Bassini,111 the issue was not the existence of private rights under the Act,
but rather whether the plaintiffs had individual standing to bring direct claims, as opposed to
derivative claims, under sections 36(a), 36(b), and 48 of the Act. 112 In applying Maryland law to
that question, however, the court reviewed the policy objectives underlying the 1940 Act to
determine whether Maryland shareholder standing law conflicted with those policies. 113 The
court held that "the potential availability of direct action" was consistent with the general
policies of the Act, and that the plaintiffs allegations supported direct claims under sections
36(a), 36(b), and 48. Like the sections at issue in Olmsted, however, section 48 provides only
that certain conduct is "unlawful," and section 36(a) provides only that the SEC is authorized to

107

Olmsted, 283 F. 3d at 434 n.4.

108

Id. at 433 n.3.

109

Id.

110

Id. at 433 (quoting Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 572).

11 282 F. 3d 162 (2d Cir. 2002).
112

Strougo, 282 F. 3d at 169.

113

Id. at 174-76.
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bring civil actions; neither contains "rights-creating language" as defined by Olmsted."14 The
grant of authority to the SEC that, to the Olmsted court, evidenced congressional intent against

private rights of action applies equally to section 48 and especially to section 36(a), which itself
is a specific grant of authority to the SEC. 1 5 Again, the question of the general availability of
private suit under these sections was not technically at issue on appeal in Strougo, but one would
think that Circuit Judge Sack, who himself would author the Olmsted decision one week later,
would at least have commented on the issue in Strougo before allowing such claims to proceed.

V. CONCLUSION
In its fundamental analysis, and in its result, the Olmsted court appears to have gotten it
right. The court honed in on a crucial distinction glossed over by courts interpreting the 1940
Act and other statutes for years: the distinction between the term "implied" and the term
"inferred." An "implied" private right of action must indeed be inplied; it must actually be
communicated by Congress, albeit indirectly. Only Congress can "imply" a right of action; for
years, despite the commonly- used phrase, courts had not really been "implying" rights of action,
but rather "inferring" them, drawing their own conclusions from the evidence or circumstances
surrounding actual congressional statements. In fact, as the Olmsted court recognized, courts had
moved beyond mere inference, which at least centers on Congress's intent, and had begun simply
determining whether private rights of action were consistent with the policies and goals of a
particular statute. Olmsted adhered to the fundamentals, as Cort v. Ash had taught: if Congress
did not specifically intend the existence of a right of action, no such right could exist. And, as
Central Bank had taught, courts may not perform intellectual gymnastics or rely on
circumstantial evidence to glean congressional intent. In fact, if Congress did not itself create a
right of action, and if the presumption that leads from that fact is strengthened by other
evidentiary factors, the inquiry essentially should end, absent unique and extraordinary indicators
to the contrary.
Constrained by the issue before it, however, the Olmsted court could only go so far. The
court rested its decision on principles at odds with the principles supporting earlier decisions
concerning other sections of the very same act. To the extent it attempted to explain the
incongruence, its efforts, inevitably, were unsuccessful.
The importance of the 1970
amendments in the Olmsted court's limitation of its holding is a stretch, and is inconsistent. As
Central Bank taught, the addition of section 36(b) meant nothing in terms of congressional
intent, other than the fact that that Congress desired to create a specific fiduciary duty with
respect to compensation and an express private right of action for breaches of that duty. Fogel II
was right on this point -- the addition of section 36(b) does not equal congressional overruling of
those implied private actions already recognized by the courts. Nor did it evidence congressional
acceptance of that practice, however, and more importantly, it evidenced absolutely nothing
about the intentions of the 1940 Congress intentions with respect to private rights under the Act.
Even Congress's warning that the addition of section 36(b) did not imply any effect on section
114

Olmsted, 283 F. 3d at 432; see 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (a); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-47.

115

See Olmsted, 283 F. 3d at 433; 15 U.S.C. § 80(a)-36(a).
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36(a) says only just that: it says nothing about implied rights of action, it means nothing at all
about the remainder of the Act, and, even if it were an acceptance of implied rights under the
Act, it says nothing about the intentions of the 1940 Congress on that subject.
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